In 2011, I published an article in the Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law examining space-based solar power (SBSP) and the issue of property rights in space, and more specifically, in geostationary orbit (GEO), under the current regime of international treaties and policies. Today, as the demand for computing power grows, that question is not only important; it is imminent.
Engineers have discussed collecting solar power in Earth’s orbit (SBSP), since the 1960s. Yet the concept largely stalled for decades due to a combination of technical, regulatory, and legal challenges. Among other things, beaming electricity down through the atmosphere, whether by microwave or laser, turns an elegant engineering concept (which may technically be feasible) into a regulatory minefield. Spectrum coordination, safety concerns, land use for receivers, cross-border approvals, animal rights, international treaties, and public acceptance all collide at once. That “last mile” problem has quietly stalled SBSP for decades.
Now, the demanding need for power around the world, fueled in part by increasing need for data centers, and artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, are bringing this 60-year-old technology back into focus. Orbiting data centers change the legal equation. Instead of beaming SBSP back to Earth—where it could trigger spectrum battles, safety regulation, environmental review, and geopolitical issues—operators would generate and use the power in orbit. By eliminating the step of transmitting power to Earth, orbiting data centers would remove SBSP’s most legally contentious step.
Recent regulatory filings and announcements suggest that orbital infrastructure is moving from concept, closer to deployment. In January 2026, SpaceX filed with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for authority to deploy up to one million satellites described as “orbital data centers” in non-geostationary orbit. The FCC’s acceptance of that filing and initiation of a public comment cycle transformed what had been abstract into a live administrative proceeding—with consequences for spectrum, debris mitigation, and public-interest. That proceeding is one of the first real legal battlegrounds for space infrastructure, and there are a few gaps in the law that must be addressed before orbital activity reaches industrial proportions.
From Theory to Commercial Reality
Aside from SpaceX’s recent filing, public reporting and regulatory filings document multiple other commercial initiatives, including Starcloud’s filing for an 88,000-satellite constellation aimed at deploying AI data centers in space. At the same time, major players in the market, such as Google (with its “Project Suncatcher”), are already exploring ways to integrate continuous solar power with data processing in orbit. On the SBSP front, startups like Aetherflux, alongside national policy discussions in the UK, China, and Japan, forecast a near-term acceleration in space solar initiatives aimed at both power-to-Earth and orbital energy markets.
When I wrote about SBSP in 2011, the debate focused on whether solar power satellite would change the international law dynamics because of the increased need for established property rights in space. That has not happened—whether for technical reasons, or legal reasons. But what has changed is that one of the areas of legal concern (transmitting power to Earth), may no longer be a concern, if data centers consume that power in space. The remaining areas of legal concern, however, remain as commercial parties push the envelope to get access to cheaper, better, more consistent power, for the growing needs on Earth. Likewise, the legal landscape is likely to change with it.
Space Treaties Provide Little Guidance for Large-Scale Commercial Infrastructure in Orbit
As I mentioned in my 2011 paper on SBSP, the seminal space treaty—the Outer Space Treaty of 1967—and subsequent agreements were drafted for an era when outer space activity was government-led, limited in scale, and focused on scientific exploration. They do not meaningfully address today’s reality of commercialization, high-density real estate in space, commercial mobility, and private investments in orbit.
A satellite is a “space object” under treaties, but an orbital data center is critical to the information infrastructure. The regime treats hardware; it does not address data governance, privacy, cybersecurity, cross-border control of data processing resources, or sanctions compliance for AI systems that are hosted in orbit. These areas are now core challenges that will likely be addressed in treaties to come. Perhaps we may soon see legislation revisit whether or not there can be property rights in outer space.
Orbital Allocation and Saturation Are Unregulated at the Treaty Level
At this time, there is no binding mechanism that limits how many satellites may occupy a given orbital shell. The non-appropriation principle prohibits national sovereignty, but it does not prevent de facto exclusion through sheer volume and regulatory recognition. What was once theoretical in the context of geostationary orbital control is now tangible in low Earth orbit. Equally, there is no global framework to prioritize uses of limited orbital regime (such as communications vs. data processing vs. SBSP) or to reconcile competing strategic priorities between major space powers.
Currently, data centers could be placed in GEO, where sunlight is abundant. However, space is limited and debates over ownership of such international space may likely heat up. Geostationary orbit is already regulated as a scarce, high-value resource. While international space law treaties avoid the word “property,” the GEO system behaves in property-like ways: through priority, exclusivity, enforcement, and loss of rights for non-use.
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) coordinates exactly where in GEO or Low Earth Orbit (LEO) you can place satellites. And to prevent speculative filings—so-called “paper satellites”—the ITU imposes a bring-into-use (BIU) clock. If a satellite network is not actually deployed within that window, the filing can expire and priority can be lost. Of course, this is not without exception. For example, Rivada Space Networks sought relief from the requirement to place 10% of its constellation of satellites into LEO by September 2023. The ITU granted a conditional waiver, postponing the initial milestone and allowing Rivada to amend the time frame and obtain additional time to deploy the satellites.
Legally, the Rivada decision underscores three points. First, a waiver does not amend the ITU treaty; it only suspends enforcement of a particular deadline. The underlying obligation to demonstrate use remains, and future milestones must be satisfied. Second, credible proof of capability, not intent, is essential. Detailed evidence of funding, manufacturing, and launch readiness thus far have carried weight. Third, BIU compliance is critical: failure to comply without a waiver can result in cancellation of spectrum rights, undermining the plan to launch the satellites into orbit, and potentially can cause multi-million-dollar damages.
For SBSP satellite data center constellations, this is critical. These systems may depend on secure, internationally recognized spectrum assignments of slots in GEO to transmit data and coordinate operations. Missed BIU milestones could collapse priority status and jeopardize financing, launch deadlines, and contractual relationships among the parties working on accomplishing the project. From a legal standpoint: BIU risk management, documented contracts, capital commitments, timelines, and realistic deployment schedules, must be put in place before filing for a slot, not after.
These emerging conflicts are also likely to intersect with local regulatory frameworks, particularly in jurisdictions that host launch facilities, satellite operators, or other infrastructure connected to operating the satellites. Florida—home to Cape Canaveral and one of the world’s most active launch sites—will likely play an important role in shaping the commercial and regulatory frameworks concerning launching solar power satellite data centers into space. As companies continue to launch more and more satellites into orbit, regulatory oversight concerning launch licensing, satellite authorization, and export-control (and sanctions-related issues), will increasingly intersect with the legal frameworks on the ground.
International Legal Implications of Debris in Orbit
The Liability Convention formally known as the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, establishes a framework for accountability among nations for damages caused by space activities. If the damage occurs in outer space, liability is based on fault, requiring evidence of negligence or willful misconduct. The Convention also outlines procedures for settling claims and provides a framework for accountability. The European Space Agency’s 2025 Space Environment Report shows that orbital congestion is increasing, and this will only increase the risk of collisions and damages caused in space.
In 2023, the FCC announced its first-ever space-debris enforcement action, entering into a consent decree with DISH Operating LLC for failing to properly deorbit its EchoStar-7 satellite. DISH agreed to pay a $150,000 penalty and implement a compliance plan to ensure better tracking of propellant and adherence to satellite disposal regulations. This action marks a significant step in addressing the growing issue of orbital debris, as the FCC has increased its focus on satellite policy and enforcement of space debris rules.
The penalty was modest, but the precedent is significant. For the first time, failure to comply with debris-mitigation commitments resulted in formal enforcement consequences. For SBSP and orbital data centers—platforms that are inherently large and designed for long operational lifespans—this point is particularly significant.
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
As commercial activity expands, operators will encounter a growing number of disputes—not only involving debris claims and liability, but also contract performance, service outages, and the governance of joint ventures operating in orbit. International arbitration is likely to become the preferred mechanism for resolving these conflicts, and we expect the law in this area to develop rapidly. The central question is which legal framework is best suited for resolving space-related disputes.
Jurisdictions such as Miami, which has evolved as a leading hub for international arbitration involving cross-border commerce, infrastructure, and energy disputes, will likely increasingly serve as a venue of choice for resolving conflicts arising from the construction, financing, launch-related issues, and operation of solar power satellites and AI data infrastructure in space.
What to Watch For
The international framework is not going to be rewritten anytime soon; the non‑appropriation of property in outer space is, and continues to be, a foundational principle. However, it is evident that we can expect practical rules around it to move quickly. Items that may change include:
- Risk‑Based Access. Regulators and industry groups may start requiring financial guarantees tied to collision and debris risk.
- More Transparency. Big constellations will likely have to share real‑time position and maneuver data, possibly under some kind of multinational coordination.
- Safety Rules for Power Beaming. If SBSP becomes real, countries will need agreed‑upon standards to protect aviation and manage transmission safety.
- Cyber and Data Requirements. Space licenses will increasingly include cybersecurity and data‑governance obligations.
- Clearer Dispute Pathways. Expect specialized arbitration rules and dedicated forums for disagreements over service, jurisdiction, space, and state responsibility.
Space Law Is Poised to Change
Solar power satellites and orbital data centers are no longer theoretical proposals. Regulatory filings, commercial investments, press releases, and other developments now place real pressure on the existing (outdated) space-law framework, which was built for exploration, rather than commercialization. The orbital‑control questions I raised in 2011 have not gone away; they’ve only evolved.
We are moving into a moment where “permission” basically becomes control, licensing ends up doing the work of allocating space, and you can still have priority and exclusion even without anything that looks like formal property ownership. The question is for how long? The gaps in the system are quite obvious. The law is going to shift fast, and the next decade will show whether regulators can keep up with infrastructure that now stretches well beyond Earth.
—Aleksey Shtivelman is a partner in the Miami office of Shutts & Bowen LLP, where he is a member of the International Litigation and Arbitration Practice Group.
