Five U.S. regional grid operators have submitted sweeping tariff reforms to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that could fundamentally change how data centers and other large electricity consumers connect to the transmission system, secure access to generating capacity, and pay for the necessary infrastructure.
The proposals, filed Nov. 13 and 16 in response to FERC’s June 18 show-cause orders, mark a broad effort, seeking to accelerate large-load energization without compromising grid reliability or shifting the costs of new infrastructure to existing customers. Broadly, the grid operators appear to be willing to adopt a 50-MW threshold to identify large loads, but their proposals are substantially different in the conditions under which those customers could obtain transmission service, the capacity they would need to secure, and the operational and financial obligations they would assume.
Among the most significant developments is the expansion of transmission service options that could allow large loads to withdraw electricity from the grid on a non-firm basis, potentially before all the network upgrades required for firm service are completed.
Three grid operators—the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), under its proposed Grid Responsive Integration Transmission Service (GRITS); the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), as part of its new Large Load Integration Procedures (LLIP) and associated market rules; and ISO New England (ISO-NE)—have proposed mechanisms that would use wholesale electricity prices to trigger reductions in grid withdrawals, though the thresholds, market mechanics, and associated capacity obligations differ.
The filings also advance markedly different approaches to resource adequacy. Under its proposed “Bring Your Own New Capacity” (BYONC) requirement, ISO-NE would require large loads seeking firm transmission service to secure incremental new capacity. NYISO would allow large loads whose addition would adversely affect resource adequacy to secure firm withdrawal rights through long-term arrangements with qualifying resources that need not be physically co-located. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO), by contrast, argues that a customer-specific generation procurement requirement is unnecessary under its existing resource adequacy framework and has proposed a Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI) arrangement to accommodate earlier energization subject to transmission constraints.
PJM Interconnection, meanwhile, has proposed a Fast Energization Process that would consolidate generation interconnection and large-load transmission service studies into a single 12-month cycle. In a separate filing, PJM also proposed ride-through requirements, which will establish “thresholds through which data centers must remain connected to the grid, rather than switching to backup generation, to avoid large transfers of load that can destabilize the system.” PJM’s transmission owners, acting collectively under the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, have separately proposed a new methodology that would distribute responsibility for the costs of transmission reinforcements identified through that process among transmission customers and generation developers.
A Region-Specific Regulatory Approach
The November filings stem from six proceedings FERC initiated June 18 under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), after the Commission preliminarily found that existing regional transmission tariffs may be unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential in their treatment of large loads. The orders identified five broad areas for reform: efficient transmission service studies, rules for co-located loads and loads served by behind-the-meter generation, transmission services for flexible loads, studies of generating facilities serving electrically proximate large loads and co-located loads, and transparency in infrastructure costs and cost allocation. As significantly, FERC directed the grid operators to separately address how they intend to ensure adequate generation capacity to serve existing and new large loads.
The Commission provided an avenue for each regional transmission organization (RTO) and independent system operator (ISO) to propose tariff revisions tailored to its existing transmission, market, and regulatory framework under Section 205 of the FPA. On Aug. 14, the Commission granted requests to hold the show-cause proceedings in abeyance to accommodate those filings, establishing response deadlines of Nov. 16 for five grid operators and Nov. 20 for Southwest Power Pool (SPP). ISO-NE submitted its proposal Nov. 13, followed on Nov. 16 by CAISO, MISO, NYISO, PJM, and PJM’s transmission owners. SPP’s filing is expected Friday.
PJM’s filings also address outstanding compliance obligations from a separate proceeding FERC initiated in February 2025 on the co-location of large loads at generating facilities. The Commission first advanced new transmission service options for co-located loads in PJM before proposing their broader application across all six jurisdictional regional grid operators.
The June orders also advance objectives outlined in an Oct. 23, 2025, directive from Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who invoked Section 403 of the Department of Energy (DOE) Organization Act to initiate rulemaking procedures on large-load interconnection to the interstate transmission system. FERC opted to pursue region-specific reforms under Section 206 of the FPA while keeping the broader rulemaking proceeding (Docket No. RM26-4-000) open, including to address large-load integration outside organized regional markets.
“The tailored show cause orders encourage each RTO/ISO to work with its transmission owners and stakeholders to address the challenges to timely interconnect large loads. This region-specific approach has the advantage of allowing each RTO/ISO to develop its unique solutions. For example, in contrast to a rulemaking that would propose uniform national standards, the show cause orders allow FERC to recognize different paths to progress in this area, such as the tariff progress already made by the PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM) and SPP regions,” FERC’s Office of Public Participation explained in guidance updated Oct. 19.
The November proposals, notably, remain subject to FERC review, and several of the most significant reforms would require additional tariff filings, stakeholder proceedings, or market software development before implementation.
Transmission Access and Resource Adequacy
At the heart of the November reforms is a distinction between two types of flexibility: the ability of a large load to operate temporarily under transmission constraints while network upgrades are completed, and its willingness to accept restrictions on electricity withdrawals as a long-term condition of service. But another major consideration is resource adequacy. Even where sufficient transmission capability exists to serve a new industrial facility or data center, a region may lack sufficient generating resources to reliably accommodate that demand. The proposed tariffs address both constraints through different combinations of transmission service rights, mandatory curtailment, and capacity procurement obligations.
MISO. Under its proposed Interim Network Integration Transmission Service (NITS) and optional Firm Service Step Up process, a large load could initially receive a combination of firm and non-firm transmission service and progressively convert portions of its interim service to firm service as additional transmission capability becomes available. The load would remain subject to existing capacity procurement requirements throughout the transition.
GRITS [Grid Responsive Integration Transmission Service], by contrast, would establish an ongoing alternative to conventional network transmission service. MISO illustrates the arrangement using a 500-MW facility that elects to secure 200 MW of firm transmission service and up to 300 MW of non-firm service. While both quantities would be governed by a single service agreement, MISO would model them at separate commercial pricing nodes to account for differences in reservation rights, interruption requirements, billing, and capacity obligations. Firm GRITS could be reserved for periods of at least one year, while non-firm GRITS could be reserved for periods ranging from one day to one month.
Under its proposed GRITS market rules, MISO would require market participants representing non-firm demand to submit price-sensitive demand bids and would incorporate that demand into its security-constrained unit commitment and economic dispatch processes. Non-firm demand would be subject to interruption when the locational marginal price (LMP) at its commercial pricing node exceeds $100/MWh.
The proposed GRITS Offer Cap corresponds to the first non-zero step of MISO’s market-wide short-term reserve demand curve, which establishes a price for increasingly scarce short-term operating reserves. MISO intends the threshold to restrict non-firm consumption before an operating reserve shortfall occurs. Historical market data suggest that the threshold would permit service in more than 95% of hours, MISO said. However, a capacity advisory in the applicable local balancing authority area would require curtailment of the entire non-firm GRITS load even if the LMP remains below $100/MWh.
The firm portion of a GRITS customer’s demand would remain in MISO’s coincident peak demand forecast and retain the corresponding obligation to procure Zonal Resource Credits (ZRCs), which represent accredited capacity under MISO’s resource adequacy framework. Non-firm GRITS demand may be excluded from the obligation to procure ZRCs, in which case it would not be included in the forecast. Unlike Interim NITS, whose customers retain capacity obligations as they progress toward firm transmission service, GRITS would allow customers to permanently limit the quantity of capacity they must procure by accepting corresponding restrictions on electricity withdrawals.
MISO would also prohibit non-firm GRITS demand from participating as a Demand Response Resource, Load Modifying Resource, or Emergency Demand Response resource. MISO said the Demand Response Resource prohibition is consistent with FERC Order No. 745, which governs compensation for demand response in organized wholesale energy markets, and that the Load Modifying Resource prohibition follows from non-firm GRITS demand not having an obligation to procure ZRCs.
ISO New England. ISO-NE proposes three new transmission service categories: Firm Contract Demand Service, Non-Firm Contract Demand Service, and Interim Contract Demand Service. Under its proposed Bring Your Own New Capacity (BYONC) framework, outlined in Section II.59 of its Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), large-load customers seeking firm service would be required to designate, or arrange for the designation of, sufficient new capacity resources to meet their requested firm demand. Customers would receive interim service for that demand until the designated resources achieve commercial operation.
Essentially, the proposed provisions would put developers on notice of the new capacity requirements ahead of a more detailed tariff filing anticipated in 2027. Significant questions remain unresolved, including how to define “new” capacity, accredit resources, set locational requirements, and treat designated resources under ISO-NE’s Pay-for-Performance settlement mechanism. Large loads receiving interim or non-firm contract demand service would be excluded from the region’s Installed Capacity Requirement and exempt from capacity charges.
ISO-NE would, however, exempt qualifying demand at facilities already in operation or sufficiently under construction as of June 18, 2026. If a facility’s gross peak demand increases by 50 MW or more above its exempt demand, the incremental demand would become subject to the new large-load requirements. The previously exempt demand would transition to Firm Contract Demand Service and become subject to the operational requirements but would remain exempt from the new study and capacity designation requirements.
ISO-NE has proposed a Large Load Re-Dispatch Price of $250/MWh for both interim and non-firm service, which corresponds to the penalty factor for replacement reserves, a voluntary reliability service in New England. Based on hourly load-zone prices from 2021 through 2025, ISO-NE said the proposed price occurred in approximately 1% of hours.
But, unlike MISO’s proposed requirement for price-sensitive demand bids, ISO-NE would make the submission of demand bids optional. In the absence of a bid, the grid operator would schedule consumption based on the load’s submitted demand forecast, its authorized transmission service quantities, and the redispatch price. The proposal would also allow qualifying co-located or electrically proximate generation to satisfy part or all of a redispatch instruction, potentially reducing the need to curtail the facility’s electricity consumption. ISO-NE plans to review the $250/MWh threshold through its stakeholder process beginning in 2027.
NYISO. Under its proposed Large Load Integration Procedures, NYISO would determine eligibility for Firm Withdrawal Service through a project-specific resource adequacy assessment over a 10-year study horizon.
For projects subject to the standard assessment, a large load that degrades resource adequacy by the equivalent of 25 MW or less would be eligible for its full requested amount of firm service, subject to resolution of transmission security violations. NYISO says the 25-MW tolerance accounts for inherent limitations in the precision of probabilistic resource adequacy models. If the degradation exceeds 25 MW, NYISO would determine how much of the requested service must be non-firm to restore the system’s loss-of-load expectation to its pre-project level.
Developers could mitigate adverse resource adequacy impacts through two mechanisms: a Co-Located Arrangement, under which the associated resource and large load share a point of interconnection, or a Partner Resource Arrangement, under which the associated resource could be located elsewhere within the same capacity region. Both arrangements would have a 15-year term.
During that period, the portion of a large load’s firm withdrawal rights attributable to the associated resource would remain contingent on the resource’s continued participation in NYISO’s Installed Capacity (ICAP) market. If the resource enters an ICAP-ineligible forced outage, is mothballed or retired, or otherwise exits the capacity market, the corresponding portion of the load’s service would be reclassified as Non-Firm Withdrawal Service. Firm rights could be restored if the resource resumes eligible participation. After the 15-year term expires, those withdrawal rights would no longer depend on the associated resource’s continued capacity market participation.
NYISO also proposes a category of State Exempt Large Load Projects. The New York State Department of Public Service could identify projects for exemption through a mechanism established in the New York State Public Service Commission’s ongoing large-load interconnection proceeding. NYISO would assess the collective resource adequacy impact of those projects under an alternative standard. If their combined impact does not violate applicable New York State Reliability Council resource adequacy criteria over the first five years of the study, the projects would be eligible for their full requested amounts of firm service, subject to transmission security requirements.
NYISO’s proposed $200/MWh maximum bid price for Non-Firm Withdrawal Service draws on a different reliability mechanism from those proposed by MISO and ISO-NE: transmission scarcity pricing. Under NYISO’s existing Constraint Specific Shortage Pricing mechanism, a six-step transmission demand curve produces a constraint price of $4,000/MWh at full utilization of a transmission facility’s Constraint Reliability Margin.
To establish its bid cap, NYISO applied a 5% materiality threshold derived from the North American Electric Reliability Corp.’s (NERC’s) Transmission Loading Relief procedures. A non-firm load whose shift factor, a measure of how strongly its withdrawals affect flows across a constraint, meets that 5% threshold would, except in rare cases, receive a nodal price of $200/MWh when the constraint price reaches $4,000/MWh. The proposed bid cap is intended to allow market dispatch to curtail non-firm loads before manual operator intervention becomes necessary.
NYISO would exclude large loads taking any amount of Non-Firm Withdrawal Service from its Demand Side Resource programs, even if a portion of their demand receives firm service. The grid operator has also proposed a separate System Reliability Benefit Fee to allocate capacity market costs to demand without firm withdrawal rights in an amount roughly commensurate with the benefits that demand receives from ICAP resources.
PJM. PJM’s proposed Firm Contract Demand Transmission Service, Non-Firm Contract Demand Transmission Service, and Interim NITS would establish a framework for accommodating flexible demand without a uniform wholesale price-based curtailment threshold.
Under its proposed Part XI tariff provisions, PJM would assign firm contract demand service the same curtailment priority as conventional NITS and firm point-to-point transmission service. Non-firm contract demand service and Interim NITS would have the same curtailment priority as non-firm point-to-point service.
Firm contract demand service would provide both energy and capacity, and customers taking it would retain applicable generation capacity obligations. Non-firm contract demand service would provide energy on an as-available basis. PJM describes Interim NITS as an energy-only service that is not capacity backed, and PJM’s transmission owners said customers taking it would not be assessed generation capacity charges, unlike MISO’s proposed treatment of Interim NITS. The transmission owners have proposed separate rate methodologies for the new transmission services.
To prevent customers from switching between firm and non-firm contract demand service to avoid capacity costs, PJM would prohibit customers from obtaining non-firm contract demand service for any portion of a load previously served under firm contract demand service for five years following the effective date of the relevant transmission service agreement.
CAISO. California, meanwhile, has proposed a substantially different approach that seeks to preserve its existing transmission access and resource adequacy frameworks. Under Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI), participating transmission owners would develop project-specific operating restrictions to allow large loads to energize before completion of required transmission upgrades.
The restrictions could include preset operating schedules, enforceable operating requirements, automated remedial action schemes, or load curtailment performed by the transmission owner after a transmission contingency occurs. CAISO has declined to propose a uniform duration or capacity limit for FILI arrangements. The grid operator plans to begin a separate stakeholder initiative in 2027 to explore permanent flexible load interconnection, which could allow customers to avoid certain transmission network upgrades by accepting ongoing restrictions on electricity withdrawals.
Because CAISO does not administer a centralized forward capacity market, responsibility for procuring adequate resources rests principally on load-serving entities (LSEs) under requirements established by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and other applicable local regulatory authorities.
“This distinction can remove an important barrier to timely service: a large load customer need not independently secure new generating capacity or satisfy a separate CAISO forward-capacity-market requirement as a condition of interconnection,” CAISO explained in its Nov. 16 filing. “The CAISO has no centralized forward capacity market; instead, serving load remains subject to the resource adequacy obligations applicable to its load-serving entity (LSE) and the requirements of the relevant local regulatory authority. The absence of a customer-specific generation requirement therefore does not eliminate advance capacity procurement obligations or guarantee immediate service at every location.”
CAISO acknowledged that the effectiveness of its framework depends on timely resource procurement and development and that large loads could materialize faster than existing forecasts and procurement processes anticipate. The grid operator said it intends to continue evaluating those risks in coordination with California’s energy agencies.
| Grid Operator | Proposed Transmission Services | Duration and Service Conditions | Non-Firm Curtailment Mechanism | Resource Adequacy and Capacity Obligations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) | Grid Responsive Integration Transmission Service (GRITS); Interim Network Integration Transmission Service (NITS); optional Firm Service Step Up process. | Interim NITS provides transitional service. GRITS offers an ongoing firm and non-firm service mix. Firm GRITS reservations: at least one year; non-firm reservations: one day to one month. | Non-firm GRITS subject to interruption when the locational marginal price exceeds $100/MWh and during applicable capacity advisories. Interim NITS curtailment is not imposed solely to mitigate economic congestion. | Firm GRITS and Interim NITS retain capacity obligations. Non-firm GRITS demand may be excluded from capacity procurement requirements and coincident peak demand forecasts. |
| ISO New England (ISO-NE) | Firm Contract Demand Service, Non-Firm Contract Demand Service, and Interim Contract Demand Service. | Interim service available pending required network upgrades and new capacity resources, for up to seven years or until required upgrades are in service, whichever is longer. Service permanently transitions to non-firm if capacity designation requirements remain unmet at the end of that term. Ongoing non-firm service is also available. | Redispatch of interim and non-firm demand above $250/MWh. Qualifying co-located or electrically proximate generation may satisfy redispatch instructions. | Firm service requires sufficient new capacity under the proposed bring-your-own-new-capacity requirement, subject to exemptions for qualifying existing demand. Interim and non-firm demand excluded from the Installed Capacity Requirement and exempt from capacity charges. |
| New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) | Firm Withdrawal Service and Non-Firm Withdrawal Service; Zero Withdrawal Service Load designation. | Firm and non-firm withdrawal rights determined through project-specific studies. Co-Located Arrangements and Partner Resource Arrangements have a term of 15 years. | $200/MWh maximum bid price for non-firm demand; additional operator-directed curtailment when required for reliability. | Resource adequacy assessment over a 10-year horizon, subject to a 25-MW degradation tolerance under the standard assessment. Associated resources may support firm withdrawal rights. Proposed System Reliability Benefit Fee applies to non-firm withdrawal service and Zero Withdrawal Service Loads. |
| PJM Interconnection (PJM) | Firm Contract Demand Transmission Service, Non-Firm Contract Demand Transmission Service, and Interim Network Integration Transmission Service (NITS). | Interim NITS provides transitional service. Customers cannot convert previously committed firm contract demand to non-firm contract demand for five years following the relevant service agreement’s effective date. | Curtailment under applicable transmission service priorities. Non-firm contract demand service and Interim NITS have the same priority as non-firm point-to-point service. No uniform wholesale price threshold proposed. | Firm contract demand service retains applicable capacity obligations. Non-firm contract demand service provides energy on an as-available basis. Interim NITS is energy-only and would not incur generation capacity charges. |
| California Independent System Operator (CAISO) | Flexible Interim Load Interconnection (FILI). | Project-specific restrictions apply pending completion of required transmission upgrades. No uniform duration or capacity limit proposed. Permanent flexible interconnection to be explored in a stakeholder initiative expected to begin in 2027. | Preset operating schedules, enforceable operating requirements, remedial action schemes, or curtailment by transmission owners. No uniform wholesale price threshold proposed. | No separate customer-specific generation procurement requirement. Existing load-serving entity resource adequacy obligations remain applicable under state and local regulatory requirements. |
Notes: All services and requirements reflect proposed tariff revisions filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on Nov. 13 and 16, 2026. Firm service remains subject to applicable emergency procedures. The three proposed wholesale price thresholds reflect different regional market and reliability mechanisms and are not directly comparable measures of expected service availability.
Sources: November 2026 FERC filings from MISO (large-load omnibus filing), MISO (GRITS), ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, the PJM transmission owners, and CAISO.
Reengineering Interconnection Studies
As the filings indicate, echoing industry concerns, the rapid emergence of large electricity consumers has exposed limitations in traditional transmission study processes, which generally evaluate new generating facilities and requests to serve new demand through separate procedures. Independent studies of a proposed 500-MW power plant and a corresponding 500-MW load, for example, could identify transmission reinforcements that a coordinated assessment of generation injections and load withdrawals might reduce or eliminate.
PJM. Among the most extensive reforms proposed in November is PJM’s Fast Energization Process, which would consolidate studies for generation and merchant transmission interconnection, long-term firm transmission service, and large-load transmission service into a single 12-month cycle—approximately half the duration of its existing interconnection cycle. The proposal advances objectives outlined in PJM’s five-year strategy, published in August.
Under proposed revisions to Part VIII of its tariff, PJM would replace three system impact study phases with an approximately four-month screening phase and a single system impact study. Two rounds of screening would provide preliminary estimates of required transmission reinforcements, their costs, and construction durations. Developers would have an opportunity after each round to assess the results and determine whether to proceed. Negotiations over final agreements would begin concurrently with the system impact study.
Perhaps more significantly, PJM would move away from identifying individual transmission upgrades attributable to specific interconnection requests and instead develop a portfolio of Interconnection Reliability Reinforcements (IRRs) to accommodate the generation and transmission service requests in each cycle.
“The Fast Energization Process moves PJM away from identifying specific upgrades and tying them to specific projects. PJM instead will analyze upgrades and reinforcements as enabling the entire Cycle cohort of generation projects and transmission service requests,” PJM explained in its FERC filing. “The resulting IRRs are optimized for the whole Cycle, which eliminates overlapping or duplicative upgrades for generation and load. This approach also allows a fractional amount of generating capacity to become deliverable faster and with greater certainty, rather than only upon completion of all required Network Upgrades.”
The accelerated process would, however, impose more stringent project readiness requirements. Generation developers would have to submit readiness deposits in full at application, and transmission customers seeking service on behalf of large loads would have to execute cost recovery agreements with the relevant transmission owners before entering the process. Physical project modifications after application would require developers to withdraw and resubmit their projects in a subsequent cycle.
PJM also proposes a 14-week Early Application Engagement period to test developers’ models and provide feedback and guidance on project readiness. The grid operator anticipates substantial time savings from automation, an approach it has already begun deploying.
As POWER reported in April 2025, PJM launched a multiyear collaboration with Google and Tapestry, Alphabet’s grid technology moonshot, to accelerate its interconnection process through artificial intelligence (AI). In a Nov. 10 report on the deployment of its HyperQ platform, Tapestry reported a 60-fold acceleration in the intake and initial review of site control documentation. The tool compressed a two-month manual process to less than 24 hours and produced readiness reports for 811 generation interconnection applications representing 220 GW of potential capacity at a median computational runtime of six minutes and 15 seconds per application. PJM, however, has stressed that its subject matter experts remain “in absolute control,” and Tapestry said PJM’s engineers perform the final compliance determinations.
The reported performance gains apply specifically to application intake and site control verification, not to engineering studies. Tapestry’s subsequent work includes technical data validation for interconnection model files, single-line diagrams, and network configuration data. PJM is in tandem developing additional modeling and analytical tools to accelerate power flow and dynamic studies.
MISO. Under its proposed Large Load Project Review (LLPR), outlined in revisions to Attachment FF of its tariff, MISO would complete three study cycles in each 365-day period. Each successive cycle would incorporate transmission system changes identified in the previous completed cycle to reduce restudy risk.
The proposal would also incorporate MISO’s previously filed Large Load Addition Resource Study (LARS), submitted Oct. 2 in Docket No. ER27-25. Unlike PJM’s proposed consolidation of generation and load requests across an entire study cycle, MISO’s LARS specifically addresses projects involving large loads of at least 200 MW that have formally partnered with a generator for a minimum of 15 years.
LLPR applications would require substantial preliminary engineering work, including a transmission owner’s interconnection study report, electrical models, single-line diagrams, identified upgrades, estimated costs, and proposed cost allocation. Applicants would also have to submit a nonrefundable $250,000 application fee and a $100,000 study deposit.
ISO New England. ISO-NE proposes to accept large-load transmission service applications on a rolling basis and assign completed applications positions in a dedicated large-load queue. The grid operator and the interconnecting transmission owner would use reasonable efforts to complete a system impact study within 90 days of execution of the applicable study agreement. Interconnection studies for qualifying co-located and electrically proximate generating facilities could proceed concurrently.
NYISO. Under its proposed Large Load Integration Procedures, NYISO would accept applications on a rolling basis and study projects in successive groups. Each of up to two initial study rounds would include a resource adequacy and modeling period and a 90-day system impact study. NYISO and the applicable transmission owners would subsequently undertake a more comprehensive Assessment of Load Integration and facilities studies in parallel.
NYISO estimates the overall process would take approximately 18 months to two years, depending on when a project enters the study cycle. NYISO acknowledged that the process would take longer than the 60- to 90-day duration contemplated in FERC’s show-cause order but argued the timeframe is reasonable given the scope of its study process. To accommodate additional applicants, NYISO would overlap initial studies for a new cycle with the more advanced assessments of the preceding cycle.
CAISO. California would preserve the existing division of responsibilities between CAISO and its participating transmission owners, which conduct load interconnection studies under their respective tariffs. CAISO proposes to coordinate and review those studies on a monthly basis to accommodate the transmission owners’ study timelines. The grid operator has prioritized reforms applicable to stand-alone loads and co-located generation and plans to examine separate provisions for electrically proximate generation and load through a future stakeholder initiative.
Alternative Transmission Technologies. FERC’s June orders also identified the need to evaluate alternative transmission technologies that could reduce the cost or shorten the construction schedules of required infrastructure. MISO, for example, would require transmission owners to document their consideration of alternative transmission technologies and grid-enhancing technologies in interconnection study reports submitted through the LLPR process.
Engineering for Co-Located and Flexible Loads
Beyond the changes to transmission planning and interconnection procedures, the November filings address a series of operational challenges associated with large loads. Recent disturbances in PJM have underscored the urgency of establishing more stringent technical requirements.
On July 22, 2026, nearly 3.9 GW of data center demand in PJM unexpectedly transferred from utility power to onsite generation in response to a transmission disturbance. System frequency reached 60.092 Hz, and voltage peaked at approximately 1.138 per unit, or 13.8% above its nominal reference value. The disturbance followed a 1.5-GW load transfer on July 10, 2024, and a 1.8-GW event on Feb. 17, 2025.
“These events affected system voltages, frequency, power flows and generator behavior in the Dominion transmission zone and across the entire Eastern Interconnection. And while safely managed by PJM’s Control Center, the scale and speed of the unexpected load transfers posed serious threats to the reliability and safety of the grid,” PJM said in a Nov. 16 Inside Lines post on its proposed operational requirements for large computational loads.
Voltage and Frequency Ride-Through. PJM, which already serves approximately 10 GW of large computational loads and forecasts 30 GW of data center-driven peak load growth between 2024 and 2030, has separately filed tariff revisions in Docket No. ER27-522-000 that would establish a category of Large Computational Load. The definition would encompass large loads of 50 MW or more that have at least 25 MW of maximum demand served through power electronic conversion equipment.
The proposed tariff revisions would require PJM to establish minimum voltage and frequency ride-through requirements in its manuals. PJM has requested a Jan. 16, 2027, effective date. Transitional facilities—those for which customers have formally initiated interconnection studies, executed qualifying interconnection or service agreements, begun construction, or reached commercial operation before the effective date—would have until Jan. 16, 2028, or one year after their commercial operation date, whichever is later, to comply.
The filing also establishes a framework for additional operational requirements, including ramp rates, electromagnetic transient performance, protective equipment, metering, telemetry, and communications. The regional provisions would complement ongoing efforts by the North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC) to develop mandatory reliability standards for computational loads.
Enforcing Withdrawal Limits. Co-located generation presents a separate operational challenge. A 500-MW data center that receives 450 MW from onsite generation and withdraws 50 MW from the transmission system could suddenly require its entire 500 MW from the grid if the generating plant trips. Unless the transmission system can accommodate the additional withdrawals, the facility must have alternative supply or controls capable of reducing demand.
Under PJM’s proposed Part XI provisions, eligible customers would be responsible for the hardware and software necessary to enforce authorized withdrawals, including, where required, fully redundant special protection schemes. An initial misoperation of a required control or protection scheme would result in suspension of withdrawals under the applicable transmission service agreement for up to 120 days, subject to mutual agreement to adjust that period. A second misoperation would result in termination of the agreement.
MISO similarly would authorize transmission owners to remotely disconnect customers taking non-firm GRITS that fail to interrupt demand as directed. Repeated violations could result in additional financial penalties and possible termination of service. ISO-NE would require demand forecasts, telemetry, communications, and equipment to facilitate remote disconnection. CAISO’s proposed FILI arrangements, meanwhile, would establish project-specific curtailment requirements, response times, and conditions for restoration of service.
Who Pays for Grid Expansion?
Perhaps the most significant commercial changes accompany PJM’s proposed consolidation of generation and load studies. The PJM transmission owners, notably, have proposed revisions to Schedule 12 of the regional tariff that would establish a distinct methodology for allocating the costs of Interconnection Reliability Reinforcements identified through each study cycle.
For the first 15 years, costs would be allocated to transmission zones containing large-load transmission service requests evaluated during the applicable cycle. The methodology would account for the location of the reinforcements and the modeled electrical impacts of large loads on transmission constraints. After 15 years, the remaining costs would be allocated under the prevailing Schedule 12 methodology for regional reliability projects.
Generation developers would also contribute through a proposed Generator Reliability Reinforcement Fee. PJM would convert each generator’s allocated share of the estimated portfolio capital cost into a levelized annual payment over 15 years, based on a capital recovery factor derived from the transmission owners’ weighted average costs of capital. Proceeds would be credited to customers in zones allocated reinforcement costs.
“In PJM, load pays for transmission service. However, the PJM Transmission Owners recognize that PJM’s combined study approach will consider impacts associated with generator interconnection requests, and thus, a contribution from generators to offset the costs of IRRs is appropriate,” the transmission owners explained.
Securing Transmission Revenues. The PJM transmission owners’ proposed Cost Recovery Agreement (CRA) would establish minimum recurring revenue commitments ranging from 80% to 100% of the revenues associated with the customer’s requested firm transmission service. Customers would pay the difference between the required contribution and qualifying revenues from transmission service actually taken. Credit support would be based on 100% of the projected full-service revenue benchmark for the remaining commitment period.
MISO proposes a different revenue guarantee. Under its Large Load Cost Recovery Agreement, where the costs of covered network upgrades are rolled into transmission rates, customers would assume financial commitments designed to recover the return on and of those investments over 20 years, including depreciation, operations and maintenance expenses, and taxes. MISO illustrates the mechanism using a $10 million annual revenue commitment: if attributable transmission service revenues total $7 million during a calendar year, the customer would owe a $3 million supplemental payment. No supplemental payment would be required if revenues meet or exceed the commitment.
ISO-NE’s participating transmission owners, meanwhile, propose a three-party Large Load Cost Recovery Agreement that would directly involve the entity developing the large-load facility. The entity would reimburse the interconnecting transmission owner for directly assigned facilities and pay applicable charges to offset revenue requirements for qualifying network upgrades. Early termination or disconnection would trigger an exit fee based on the remaining net book value of covered upgrades. The New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), notably, did not join the filing with respect to the proposed cost recovery agreement.
Pricing Interruptible Access. PJM’s transmission owners also propose to establish a maximum rate for non-firm contract demand transmission service based on the corresponding zonal firm rate and the transmission system’s load factor in that zone. In one illustrative calculation, a firm rate of $90,000/MW-year and a load factor of approximately 64.7% would produce an annualized maximum non-firm rate of $58,219/MW-year—a 35.3% discount. MISO has yet to propose specific transmission rates for GRITS.
NYISO’s proposed System Reliability Benefit Fee would address a separate issue: the capacity market benefits received by large loads that do not secure firm withdrawal rights. The charge would be assessed to load-serving entities based on the authorized quantities of non-firm or zero withdrawal service in MW, not actual energy withdrawals in MWh.
Behind-the-Meter Generation Netting. PJM proposes to limit the daily demand reduction attributable to retail behind-the-meter generation to 50 MW at a single electrical location for purposes of calculating applicable transmission charges and capacity obligations. The proposal includes transitional provisions for existing installations, protections for qualifying contractual arrangements, and exemptions for certain cogeneration facilities whose loads follow the generation offline if the generating facility trips.
ISO-NE proposes a zero-megawatt netting threshold for large loads for wholesale service settlements. NYISO proposes to discontinue its existing Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource participation model, which has only six active resources, by May 1, 2029. Its proposed large-load rules would assess several reliability-related service charges, including operating reserves, black start, voltage support, and regulation, on gross demand.
MISO would similarly assess regulation and black start charges on gross demand under GRITS. CAISO, by contrast, proposes to preserve its existing methodology for calculating transmission access charges, which allows certain onsite generation and storage output to offset facility demand, but would require gross-demand billing for regulation and black start services at large loads served by co-located generation.
| Grid Operator | Interconnection Study Process | Infrastructure Cost Recovery and Financial Protections | Behind-the-Meter Generation Treatment | Proposed Implementation Milestones |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) | Three Large Load Project Review (LLPR) cycles per 365-day period. Separate Large Load Addition Resource Study for qualifying generation-load partnerships. | 20-year revenue commitment for covered network upgrades incorporated into transmission rates. Supplemental payments cover annual revenue shortfalls. Separate recovery mechanism for qualifying upgrades outside the load’s transmission pricing zone. | Gross-demand billing for specified services under Grid Responsive Integration Transmission Service (GRITS), including regulation and black start. | First LLPR application deadline: March 1, 2027. GRITS tariff effective date requested for March 16, 2027; implementation no earlier than Jan. 1, 2029. |
| ISO New England (ISO-NE) | Rolling applications. Reasonable-efforts target of 90 days for system impact studies. Concurrent studies for qualifying co-located and electrically proximate generation. | Proposed three-party Large Load Cost Recovery Agreement directly involving the large-load entity. Cost recovery charges, financial security, and exit fees protect against unrecovered network investment. | Zero-megawatt netting threshold for large loads for wholesale service settlements. | Applications and studies: June 1, 2027. Detailed bring-your-own-new-capacity rules anticipated to be filed in 2027. New transmission services: June 1, 2028. |
| New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) | Grouped Large Load Integration Study Process lasting approximately 18–24 months. Up to two initial study rounds, followed by parallel integration and facilities assessments. | Proposed System Reliability Benefit Fee assessed to load-serving entities based on authorized non-firm or zero withdrawal service quantities. Transmission infrastructure cost recovery addressed through separate transmission owner proposals. | Existing Behind-the-Meter Net Generation Resource program proposed to close to new entrants Feb. 1, 2027, and terminate May 1, 2029. Gross-demand billing for specified reliability services. | Large Load Integration Procedures: Feb. 1, 2027. First regular study cycle: July 1, 2027. Most associated market participation revisions: June 1, 2028. |
| PJM Interconnection (PJM) | Unified 12-month Fast Energization Process. Two preliminary screening rounds and one system impact study for generation, merchant transmission, and qualifying transmission service requests. | Minimum 10-year cost recovery agreement term. Recurring revenue commitments of 80%–100% of the firm service benchmark; credit support based on 100% of that benchmark. Separate 15-year generator reinforcement fee and initial zonal reinforcement cost allocation. | Proposed 50-MW daily demand reduction limit at a single electrical location for applicable transmission and capacity calculations, subject to transitional, contractual, and cogeneration exemptions. | Most transmission service revisions: March 16, 2027. Fast Energization Process and associated reinforcement cost allocation anticipated to commence in late November 2027. |
| California Independent System Operator (CAISO) | Transmission owner-led interconnection studies, subject to coordinated CAISO review. Separate provisions for electrically proximate generation and load to be explored. | Existing division of responsibilities between CAISO and participating transmission owners retained. Transmission owner tariff provisions address customer-specific infrastructure obligations. | Existing transmission access charge methodology retained, permitting certain onsite generation offsets. Gross-demand billing proposed for regulation and black start services at large loads served by co-located generation. | Most reforms: Feb. 16, 2027. Scheduling coordinator provisions: Nov. 1, 2027. Settlement revisions: April 30, 2028. |
Notes: Study timelines do not represent guaranteed energization dates. All proposed tariff revisions and implementation schedules remain subject to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) review. Financial obligations and behind-the-meter generation treatment depend on the applicable service agreements and tariff provisions.
Sources: November 2026 FERC filings from MISO (large-load omnibus filing), MISO (GRITS), ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, the PJM transmission owners, and CAISO.
A Multiyear Implementation Effort
The timelines for the proposed reforms extend well beyond FERC’s consideration of the November filings. Most of PJM’s transmission service revisions would take effect March 16, 2027, under its requested schedule, but the Fast Energization Process and associated reinforcement cost allocation methodology would commence after its existing interconnection cycle completes its second decision point, which PJM expects in late November 2027.
ISO-NE proposes to begin accepting applications under its new study procedures on June 1, 2027, and offer its new transmission services beginning June 1, 2028. NYISO’s Large Load Integration Procedures would take effect Feb. 1, 2027, ahead of most of its associated market participation revisions on June 1, 2028. CAISO has requested a Feb. 16, 2027, effective date for most reforms, though associated settlement revisions would become effective April 30, 2028. MISO does not anticipate implementing GRITS before Jan. 1, 2029, owing to the required software modifications.
—Sonal Patel is senior editor at POWER magazine (@sonalcpatel, @POWERmagazine).
Editor’s note: This article reflects POWER’s initial analysis of the filings. A detailed review of the proposed tariff provisions and supporting documentation is ongoing, and this article may be updated to incorporate additional details and clarification.