U.S. missed the UNF boat
The closed fuel cycle option that involves reprocessing and recycling UNF has gradually gained recognition thanks to more than 40 years of demonstrated operational experience in France and a higher level of reliable economic data from actual operations. The Boston Consulting Group conducted an independent study funded by AREVA to review the economics associated with the closing stages of the once-through and recycling strategies. Proprietary data was obtained from AREVA, which reflected more than 20 years of nuclear materials reprocessing and recycling experience.
The study compared the long-term cost of recycling UNF against the possible cost of a repository handling the same UNF in a once-through strategy. In one scenario, the overall discounted cost of recycling UNF was on the order of $520/kg. This result was comparable to the cost of a once-through strategy, estimated at $500/kg, especially considering uncertainties, such as the price of uranium and repository costs.
Examining another possible scenario, the consulting group considered a new integrated recycling plant scheduled to open in 2020 that would use the COEX process, handle 2,500 metric tons per year of UNF, and be combined with a repository (such as Yucca Mountain) for storing HLW and legacy UNF. This scenario was projected to have a total net present cost of $48 billion to $53 billion. This result is equivalent to the net present cost of an exclusive once-through strategy with Yucca Mountain and an additional repository estimated at $47 billion to $50 billion.
Furthermore, the projected total undiscounted life-cycle cost for the recycling strategy would be approximately $113 billion, compared to approximately $124 billion to $130 billion for the once-through strategy. Given the intrinsic uncertainties used in the study, and the fact that almost 27 years have elapsed since President Reagan lifted the indefinite ban on U.S. commercial reprocessing activities, the economics of a recycling strategy are comparable to, if not better than, those of a once-through strategy.
International UNF reprocessing
Through international agreements and contracts, and following International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations, it is very common for European companies to ship their UNF by rail to La Hague for reprocessing and recycling. For example, 235 metric tons of UNF from Italy’s nuclear power plants will be sent to France for reprocessing.
However, French nuclear law does not allow AREVA or any other entity to take waste and keep it in France. Although the recovered uranium and plutonium can be recycled for new fuel, the vitrified waste products are returned to the country of origin or another third party, as long as it is not in France. Therefore, Italy has to take back its vitrified waste products at some point in the future, but no later than 2025 (Figure 4). Other countries that ship their UNF to France for reprocessing must adhere to the same requirements.
4. Under foot. The vitrified waste is kept in storage cells located below the floor at the La Hague facility. Courtesy: AREVA
Overseas shipments of another country’s UNF and shipments returning the vitrified waste for disposal must use specifically modified ships that adhere to the International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships (INF Code)
Hanson indicated that because processes are in place for a country to export its UNF and re-import its vitrified waste for disposal, this option could help the U.S. alleviate its UNF storage problem. However, international agreements would need to be developed between the NRC and France’s equivalent regulatory agency, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN).
“Furthermore, there is a well-utilized international program through the IAEA for transporting nuclear materials,” Hanson noted. “However, every nation that adopts these regulations tends to modify them in practice to meet their own needs. Because of that, there is a difference between the NRC’s and France’s regulations to certify nuclear transport casks. In practical purposes, there is no existing transport cask that has been licensed by both the NRC and the ASN. So there is no existing fleet of casks to move the fuel today between the United States and France. Possibly some of the existing fleet of transport casks could be adopted for this purpose, but there would need to be some up-front engineering and licensing considerations that must be worked out. Still, the biggest challenge in making this option economically justifiable is the cost of the marine transport of the used fuel and vitrified waste.”
Looking down the road
Until GNEP becomes a reality or the Yucca Mountain repository begins accepting UNF, nuclear-powered utilities are expected to continue using interim storage for the next 10 to 20 years. Furthermore, if history serves as a guide to the future, failing to follow through with a comprehensive program offered by GNEP will likely produce the same results witnessed in 1977. Since then, the indefinite deferral of reprocessing commercial UNF, and the absence of a viable alternative, has cost billions of dollars—many of them paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund—while producing few, if any, positive accomplishments. In addition, nuclear power plants have diverted resources for the storage of UNF to avoid plant closure while waiting for a licensed geologic repository to open.
If GNEP fails, expect these scenarios to be repeated again over the next 30 years, instead of the U.S. achieving energy independence, which would be a truly positive accomplishment.
—James M. Hylko (james.hylko@prs-llc.net) is an integrated safety management specialist for Paducah Remediation Services LLC and a POWER contributing editor.
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